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abstract: This paper tackles the problem of the relationship between traditional 
myths (specifically, the myth of Ares and Aphrodite being in love) and truth in 
Aristotle: are myths false, or do they convey truth in an allegorical language? and, 
in the latter case, does the lack of exactness of such language make the myth useless 
for the progress of philosophy, which proceeds by logical inference? In order to 
understand the relationship between myth and truth, the usage of the term myth­
ologein (to tell mythic tales) by Aristotle is systematically analyzed, by checking, for 
each instance of this term: (1) who is the subject of the act of telling the myth? (2) 
is the tale true? (3) if it is not true, does it reflect some aspect of reality? (4) why 
does the myth teller relate the tale? (5) what is the role of the myth in Aristotle’s 
argument? Answering these questions will make it possible to exactly understand 
the meaning of Aristotle’s reference to the myth of Ares and Aphrodite.
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In the Politics, Aristotle states that the myth about Ares and Aphrodite 
being lovers is right, because, as one can see by observing different 
communities, those who are prone to war always also have a strong 
inclination to sexual intercourses (Aristotle Pol.: 1269b27–31). In this 
paper, I try to show what the meaning of this reference to the myth is, 
and why Aristotle mentions these two Olympians while talking about 
the psychology of different races.
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1. The problem of allegory
One of the main problems discussed in the literature citing the passage 
about Ares and Aphrodite is whether Aristotle considers these and other 
myths as allegories.1 That Aristotle practiced an allegorical reading of 
myth has been the standard view for several decades, at least since the 
studies of Jean Pépin (1958: 121–124). One of the recent proponents of 
this thesis is Luc Brisson (2004: 38–40), who thinks that Aristotle sees 
the myth as a narrative embellishment of an original truth about the 
gods. Even though Thomas K. Johansen (1999) did not refer to allegory 
when discussing the role of myth in Aristotle’s philosophy, he, too, thinks 
that for Aristotle at least some myths hide a rational content, which is 
nothing else than the conclusions reached by philosophy before the last 
global cataclysm. The original form of these conclusions has been lost 
because of the catastrophe, but its content has been somehow preserved 
in a fictional form. Consequently, the myths are among the starting 
points of the current philosophical discourse.
However, Richard Bodéüs (2000: 83) has refuted the idea that Aris-
totle interprets myths allegorically. In fact, an allegorical interpretation 
requires two steps, as first the interpreter has to prove by the means of a 
rational argument that the literal meaning of the myth is not true, and 
then has to show that the myth conceals a hidden truth. Since Aristotle 
starts from the assumption that the myth is absolutely false, neither of 
these steps can be found in his works: he does not check whether the 
tales about the gods are true or not, because he already knows that they 
are false; and he does not look for a hidden truth in the myths, because 
his premise is that there is no such thing. Rather, according to Bodéüs, 
Aristotle is interested in how the sublimation of human experiences into 
myth reveals the mythmaker’s conception of men and women. This is 
how one should interpret the passages where Aristotle links the fables 
about the gods to some given features of human beings.
Similarly, Fabienne Baghdassarian (2013) has argued that, for Aris-
totle, the content of a myth is not a hidden truth to be revealed, but rather 
an idea about reality that can be false. For this reason, Aristotle cannot 
accept the traditional form of allegory as uncovering a truth concealed by 
enigmatic language. Rather, the philosopher suggests a “non-intentional 
1 In addition to the studies I mention in the next pages, one can cite Robert Mayhew’s 
(2019: 187) assertion that for Aristotle the myth of Ares and Aphrodite is not an allegory, but 
rather a story based on a fact.
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allegorical interpretation” that is based on the distinction between the 
mythical form of expression and the content, the latter being an opin-
ion about the universe or a part of it. Such opinion, while lacking the 
universality and causal explanation of the philosophical discourse, can 
shed some light on reality, and as a consequence, is something that the 
philosopher should address.
Baghdassarian’s conclusions are in agreement with the results reached 
by A. P. Bos (1983), who, while not focusing on the topic of allegory 
per se, has provided important insights about Aristotle’s conception of 
myths. Specifically, Bos has shown that, for Aristotle, mythologoi, like 
philosophers, talk about aspects of reality that transcend human daily 
life. However, myths have neither the logical soundness nor the abstract 
nature of philosophical arguments. A similar conclusion has been reached 
by Toula Vassilacou-Fassea (2002), who has argued that for Aristotle, 
while the myths retain the vestiges of a now lost wisdom, they convey 
this wisdom by the way of an unscientific, unverifiable language. As a 
consequence, the philosopher should admire the myths, but he cannot use 
them as a starting point for the progress of science. If this is Aristotle’s 
approach to myths, it seems pointless for him to devote himself to the 
allegorical reading of the tales transmitted by the ancients.
An intermediate position has been proposed by Mor Segev (2017: 
137–139), who thinks that according to Aristotle, while all myths serve 
the need of generating a sense of wonder in the people that form a po-
litical community, only some myths conceal a hidden philosophical truth, 
included by the mythmakers either intentionally or not, that can be found 
by the means of an allegorical interpretation. From a different point of 
view, Glenn W. Most (2010) argues that Aristotle’s position on allegory 
is ambivalent. On one hand, when Aristotle talks about epic poetry, he 
never introduces an allegorical reading of the verses; this makes sense, 
since he argues that poets do not grasp truth in the same complete and 
deep way as the philosophers, but just depict human experience. On 
the other hand, in Aristotle’s cataclysmic view of history, myths convey 
forgotten philosophical truths, and this implies that such truths can be 
brought to light by the means of an allegorical reading. Glenn Most 
sees this contradiction as an inner tension between Aristotle’s conscious 
rejection of allegory and the influence on him of the cultural context in 
which he operated.
It is telling that the difference between these perspectives is not 
due to these scholars highlighting different passages of the Aristotelian 
corpus or even to interpreting the same passages in different ways. Al-
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most all agree on some basic truths about Aristotle’s approach to myths: 
for Aristotle, mythos means, at least in some contexts, a false invention; 
Aristotle does not treat the tales about the gods and the heroes narrated 
in the myths as true (that is, he does not state that a god named Zeus 
did such and such thing); for Aristotle, each myth conveys a worldview; 
myth transmits a philosophical truth whose original form has been lost 
because of cataclysms; mythical language lacks the exactness that char-
acterizes philosophy.2 The disagreement is rather about the consequences 
of these basic truths. Should the original worldviews conveyed by myths 
be attributed to the poets or to the pre-cataclysmic philosophers? Does 
Aristotle associate mythos and falseness in the case of the worldviews 
conveyed by all, some or none of the traditional myths? These first two 
questions are related, as poets can hold true or false opinions, but the 
philosophers whose views have been transmitted in a mythical form 
are supposed to grasp reality correctly. In the case of truthful myths, is 
the lack of exactness of the mythical language enough to make the core 
truth useless for the progress of philosophy or not?
2. Mythologein in Aristotle
The statement about Aphrodite and Ares is part of a passage where 
Aristotle argues that the reason why, in Sparta, women have a significant 
amount of political power is that among all people who are devoted to 
war, women rule men. The only exception to this general rule is the case 
of those belligerent societies where homosexuality is openly practiced 
(Aristotle Pol.: 1269b23–32). It is in this context that Aristotle states that:
For (γάρ) the first man who told mythic tales (ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος) seems (ἔοικε) 
to have coupled (συζεῦξαι) Ares with Aphrodite not irrationally (οὐκ ἀλόγως), as 
(γάρ) all such men [that is, all men belonging to the “military and warlike races” 
whom Aristotle referred to in the previous sentence] appear to be (φαίνονται) 
inclined either to sexual intercourse with males (πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὁμιλίαν) or 
to sexual intercourse with women. (Aristotle Pol.: 1269b27–31)
In order to better understand this statement, it is useful to analyze Aris-
totle’s usage of mythologein, which means “to tell mythic tales”, possibly 
implying the invention of some story that has not really happened. One 
can ask five questions about mythologein: (1) who is the subject of this 
2 Brisson (2004: 39) asserts that philosophy is completely lost after each cataclysm, but 
he also calls “metaphysics” the kind of knowledge about the gods that the mythical tradition 
carries across the catastrophes.
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act? (2) are the tales true? (3) in any case, do they reflect some aspect of 
reality? (4) why do people tell such tales? (5) what is the role of the tale 
in Aristotle’s account?
(1) The act of mythologein is attributed by Aristotle to different 
subjects: the poets (oi poiêtai, Aristotle EE: 1230a3) and Herodotus 
(Aristotle GA: 756b6–7). In several cases, moreover, the verb has “some” 
(enioi, tines) as its subject (Aristotle HA: 609b10, Mete.: 359a17), or 
has no explicit subject at all (Aristotle EE: 1229a24, HA: 578b23–25, 
585a14, 585b23, 617a5, Ph.: 218b24). It is also notable that in three cases, 
to mythologein a given story is limited to a given region: one tale about 
a courageous main is told in Crete (Aristotle EE: 1229a24), another 
about what happened to Heracles in Chaonia is narrated in that region 
(Aristotle Mete.: 359a27), and one about people sleeping among the 
heroes can be heard in Sardinia (Aristotle Ph.: 218b24). In the second 
case, the inhabitants of that region are the subject of the mythologein (in 
the other two passages, the verb is used in the passive voice). The local 
circulation of these tales may hint at their falseness: as truth is universal, 
it naturally tends to be known by all humankind; as a consequence, a 
tale that does not cross the borders between different people seems to 
be false. However, it is also possible that these tales extend only locally 
because they are about a local event.3
(2a) Sometimes mythologein means to tell something that is not true 
about a natural phenomenon. For example, Aristotle mentions the tales 
about the hind being particularly long-lived, noting that none of these 
tales is manifest (saphes), i.e. has been actually verified. Indeed, according 
to the philosopher the features of hinds that can be easily observed, like 
how much time it takes for them to fully form in the womb and then 
to become adult, match the ones of animals whose lives are way shorter 
than the ones of fabled hinds (Aristotle HA: 578b23–26). It is important 
to highlight that the idea that hinds live a particularly long life is labeled 
as a mythos not because nobody has directly observed a very old hind, but 
because nothing we see of these animals is consistent with the duration 
3 The reference to the mythos about the reproduction of fish told by Herodotus (Aristotle 
GA: 756b6–7) may also hint at a local nature of the tale, at least if one accepts Platt’s reading 
of the passage. As a matter of fact, Platt translates these words in the following way: “even the 
fishermen repeat the same simple tale, so much noised abroad, as does Herodotus the story-teller” 
(Platt 1912). Given that Herodotus is talking about the fish that can be found in the swamps 
of Southern Egypt (Herodotus: II.93), Aristotle may mean that this explanation of how fish 
reproduce is told in Egypt, where Herodotus learned about it. This possibly local tale, too, may 
refer to a local phenomenon, but in this case it is surely false, as Aristotle explicitly states so.
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of their life being significantly longer than that of other similar animals. 
In other words, the difference between mythos and science is that only 
in the latter case nature is presented as an ordered, regular set of facts. 
Other mythoi that Aristotle seems to not accept – even though in these 
cases he does not explicitly disagree with them, nor does he provide 
alternative explanations – are the one about the orioles being born from 
funeral pyres (Aristotle HA: 609b10) and the one about starred herons 
being originally slaves (Aristotle HA: 617a5–6).
In other cases, the act of mythologein is less about inventing a phe-
nomenon that does not actually occur than about linking two real but 
unrelated phenomena. In these cases, what is false is not, as in the 
previously mentioned passages, the description of a fact, but rather 
its explanation. This is the case of the fishermen who assert that fish 
are conceived by the mother swallowing the semen of the father. This 
would be impossible, because the mouth is connected to the nutritive 
system, not the reproductive one. Actually, this mythos is given not only 
by fishermen, but also by Herodotus, who is in this context defined as 
a mythologos (Aristotle GA: 756a5–756b12). As Aristotle is referring to 
the part of Herodotus’ book on Egypt where the historian describes the 
wildlife of the swamp region (Herodotus: II.93), it is clear that in this 
case mythologein means to relate something that is not only false, but 
even impossible, while believing to be truthful. It is important to notice 
that in the case of the wrong description of how fish reproduce, the 
mentioned facts are true: the mother actually swallows the semen, and 
of course new fish are conceived. What is wrong is that the description 
of the first phenomenon is incomplete (as the female fish swallows not 
only the semen produced by the male, but also her own eggs), and above 
all that the two phenomena are linked. New fish are actually conceived 
and their mother actually swallows the semen of the father, but they are 
not conceived by their mother swallowing the semen.
(2b) Some occurrences of the verb mythologein are in contexts where 
Aristotle does not take a stand about the truth value of the tale. This is 
specifically the case of the mythos about the existence of a lake in Palestine 
with some very peculiar features, for instance that something thrown 
in it does not sink but stays afloat, and that it is very salty. The latter 
characteristic is confirmed (at least within the tale) by two supposed 
phenomena that are equally odd: first, no fish live in the lake; second, 
dipping clothes in it is an efficient washing method. Now, Aristotle 
says that, if this tale is true, it would confirm his own theories (Aristotle 
Mete.: 359a16–22). The case of the people who sleep among the heroes is 
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similar, as Aristotle says that their perception of time as reported would 
corroborate the theory of time proposed in the Physics (Aristotle Ph.: 
218b21–27). This way of framing mythologein seems to imply that the 
tale that is recounted may be true, but this is not certain. The status of 
this mythos is not certain: it may be true, but it also may be false.
In some cases, to mythologein is to tell tales about figures in the 
mythical tradition. As a matter of fact, mythical tales are told about 
Heracles (Aristotle HA: 585a14, 585b22–24, Mete.: 359a27–30) and 
Chiron (Aristotle EE: 1230a3–4). The truth value of these tales depends 
on Aristotle’s assessment of the mythical tradition itself. It is not clear 
whether Aristotle refers to an invented story when he says that an ex-
ample of courage due to an irrational passion is “the man whose mythic 
tales are told in Crete” (Aristotle EE: 1229a23–24). In fact, it is not clear 
who the legendary figure is whom Aristotle is thinking of (see Rackham 
1935: 316); it may be Theseus, but this is just a hypothesis (see Inwood 
and Woolf 2013: 44).
(3a) When the mythos is just the invention of a natural phenomenon 
or a failed attempt to explain what happens in the sensible world, it 
seems to refer to no truth at all.
(3b) However, the other mythoi, despite not necessarily being true, 
are internally consistent, that is, the facts they depict could be true. For 
example, the tale that the immortal Chiron desired death when pain-
fully wounded reflects the fact that sometimes death is sought to avoid 
a grater evil, which in turn proves that not everyone who does not fear 
death is brave (Aristotle EE: 1229b32–1230a4). The tale that Heracles 
and Iphicles were born together from Alcmena despite having different 
fathers (respectively Zeus and Amphitryon) is not impossible, because, if 
a woman is impregnated twice within a short time, she can bear a child 
from each sexual act, and they will be gestated together (Aristotle HA: 
585a12–14). Heracles having seventy-one sons but only one daughter is 
consistent with the fact that some people only have male children, while 
others only have female (Aristotle HA: 585b21–24). That whoever sleeps 
among the heroes in Sardinia does so for a long time but has no percep-
tion of time (on this legend, see Simplicius in Ph.: 707.27–708.5, Philo-
ponus in Ph.: 715.16–19, Minunno 2013, Renberg 2017: I.107–108) 
makes sense, because, when the state of one’s soul does not change, one 
is not aware that time has passed (Aristotle Ph.: 218b21–27).
The case of the fabled lake in Palestine is similar to these. In fact, 
Aristotle states that, if this lake actually exists, its peculiar features are 
consistent with what philosophers have said about salty water. Indeed, 
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Aristotle did explain that water becomes thicker and able to support 
heavier weights when salt is added to it. Now, the Palestinian lake is said 
to hold even a man totally above water, but also to be very salty. These 
two features make sense together, because a body of water should be 
very salty in order to fully support a man, and, conversely, if that lake is 
actually as salty as is said, it would be so thick that one could walk on it 
(Aristotle Mete.: 359a5–22).
(4) In some cases, people mythologousin because this is the best they 
can do in order to explain what they see. For example, in the aforemen-
tioned case of the reproduction of fish, the truth is that, just as in other 
animals, reproduction happens by copulation. However, since in fish 
copulation is very quick, it is seldom observed by humans, even by those 
who, like fishermen, spend a lot of their time at sea. What fishermen see 
is actually female fish swallowing the semen and the eggs together after 
they have been laid in the act of copulation. Based on what they see, 
fishermen explain reproduction referring only to the second part of the 
actual reproductive act (Aristotle GA: 756a5–756b12). Assuming that 
this explanation of the error made by fishermen also applies to Herodotus, 
here mythologein is a failed attempt to interpret a natural phenomenon. 
Another case in which the mythologein arose in order to explain what is 
directly perceived is the tale about Heracles in Chaonia. It is told that 
the hero gave Chaonians the chance to choose between two gifts, fish 
and salt, and they preferred the latter. This mythos would explain why in 
Chaonia there is a spring of salty water that flows into a river where no 
fish can be found (Aristotle Mete.: 359a24–35).
Aristotle may hint at a similar genesis of a mythos when reporting 
the tale that the first starred herons were slaves who had been turned 
into birds. The sentence is actually ambiguous, as two key words can 
have two very different meanings, both consistent with the sense of 
Aristotle’s statement:
The ἀστερίας, which is called ὄκνος, is fabled (μυθολογεῖται) to be originally gen-
erated from slaves, and it is, in accordance with its name, the ἀργότατος of the 
herons. (Aristotle HA: 617a5–7)
The sense of the sentence depends on the meaning of the three 
words I have not translated. Ἀστερίας means “the bittern” (Liddell, Scott 
and Jones 1996: 261)4 or “the starry heron” (Thompson 1910).5 These 
4 Liddell, Scott and Jones mention History of Animals (Aristotle HA 609b22), but it is the 
same classification of herons that one finds in the passage I am analyzing.
5 Thompson translates ὁ ἀστερίας as “the starry heron (or bittern)” at 609b22 and as “the 
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are not necessarily two different meanings, as it is possible that “the 
starry heron” is the name Aristotle uses for the bittern. However, the 
word “starry heron” highlights the color of this bird. Ὄκνος is a word 
which, according to Liddell, Scott and Jones, can mean “shrinking, 
hesitation”, but can also be a synonym of ἀστερίας (Liddell, Scott and 
Jones 1996: 1212). Ἀργότατος is the superlative of ἀργός. Now, there are 
two homonymous adjectives with the same spelling ἀργός. One of them 
means “shining” and is often predicated of animals, whereas the other 
denotes laziness (Liddell, Scott and Jones 1996: 236). One can see that 
two quite different translations of the sentence are possible:
The bittern, which is called “hesitation”, is fabled to be originally generated from 
slaves, and it is, in accordance with its name, the laziest of the herons.
The starry heron, which is called oknos, is fabled to be originally generated from 
slaves, and it is, in accordance with its name, the most shining of the herons.
In the former interpretation, Aristotle is stating that this species of 
heron is the most indolent, as its name “hesitation” shows. In the latter 
reading, the meaningful name of the bird is the one cited first: not ὄκνος, 
but ἀστερίας, “starry”. This name would show that it is the heron’s plumage 
that shines the most. The correct understanding is seemingly the one I 
cited first,6 because in the very next line, summarizing what he has just 
said, Aristotle says that he has shown the different ways herons live. If 
the first reading is in fact the right one, there may be a link between the 
character of this kind of heron and its origin according to the mythos, 
for the bird’s unwillingness to use energy may be the reason why it has 
been thought that they were originally slaves.
An interesting hint about the reasons why people tell mythical 
tales can be found in the passage where Aristotle refers to Herodotus 
as mythologos. Just before stating that the historian repeats a wrong 
explanation of the reproduction of fish, Aristotle may be saying that 
this explanation amply circulates abroad (honper, Aristotle GA: 756b6).7 
Given that Herodotus is talking about fish that can be found in swamps 
of southern Egypt, it is possible that Aristotle implies that the historian 
speckled heron” at 617a5. Thompson’s translation makes it clear that “bittern” and “starry heron” 
are not two different meanings (even though in a note he states that the identification of this 
bird as the bittern is not strongly supported). 
6 This is how Thompson interprets the passage. As a matter of fact, Thompson translates 
it in the following way: “The speckled heron, which is nicknamed ‘the skulker’, is said in folk-
lore stories to be of servile origin, and, as its nickname implies, it is the laziest bird of the three 
species.” (Thompson 1910).
7 This is how Platt interprets the passage (Platt 1912).
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learned the wrong explanation from people who had not yet reached 
the level of scientific account of natural phenomena. So it may be that 
according to Aristotle the reason why Herodotus mythologei is that he 
is influenced by a pre-philosophical civilization.
Even though trying to explain some perceptible phenomenon is the 
only reason for people to mythologhein explicitly mentioned by Aristotle, 
it cannot be the only one. As a matter of fact, it is hard to see how tales 
such as Heracles having a different father than Iphicles (Aristotle HA: 
585a12–14) and having many more sons than daughters (Aristotle HA: 
585b22–24), or Chiron being in so much pain that he desired death 
(Aristotle EE: 1230a3–4), could explain something people experience.
(5a) In some cases the philosopher introduces his own description or 
explanation of a natural phenomenon as true, as opposed to the mythos. 
In this category, i.e. among the mythoi to which Aristotle opposes his 
own true account, there are the tales of hinds living exceptionally long 
lives and Herodotus’ description of how fish reproduce.
(5b) However, as we have seen, some tales are not introduced by 
Aristotle as false. In these cases, the philosophical theory does not con-
fute the tale–rather, logos and mythos agree. One should distinguish two 
different Aristotelian approaches to these tales.
(5b1) The first approach is to mention the mythos as a possible proof 
of one of Aristotle’s own statements. This is what Aristotle does when 
he states that, if the salty and dense Palestinian lake really exists, it con-
firms the link between saltiness and density that Aristotle himself has 
highlighted (Aristotle Mete.: 359a5–22). Aristotle is very clear about this:
If in Palestine there is, as some tell as a mythic tale, a lake such that, if someone 
threw a man or a beast into it, it would float and not sink down into the water, it 
would be a proof of the things I said (μαρτύριον ἂν εἴη τι τοῖς εἰρημένοις). (Aristotle 
Mete.: 359a16–20)
(5b2) Other mythoi that are internally consistent are those linked to 
traditional religion. These mythoi, too, are mentioned because they agree 
with Aristotle’s theories: Chiron being willing to give up immortality 
because of an unbearable pain agrees with the theory that not being afraid 
of death is not the same as being brave (Aristotle EE: 1229b32–1230a4), 
Heracles and Iphicles are an example of brothers from different fathers 
being born at the same time (Aristotle HA: 585a12–14), the gender 
proportion in Heracles’ offspring is mentioned in the context of the 
thesis that some people are far more likely to have sons than daughters 
(Aristotle HA: 585b21–24). Similarly, the man whose deeds are recounted 
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in Crete is an example of irrational courage (Aristotle EE: 1229a20–24). 
While not directly about figures from age-old mythology, the story of 
those who sleep for an extraordinary length of time is related to tradi-
tional religion, as these people lie at the tombs of heroes. This tale, too, 
is reported by Aristotle because it matches his own theory that when 
nothing changes in the soul, it does not perceive the passage of time 
(Aristotle Ph.: 218b21–27). However, unlike the tale of the Palestinian 
lake, these myths are not introduced by Aristotle as proofs of his own 
theories, as he just notes that what is told by the mythologoi is consistent 
with what he has said. In all these cases, Aristotle introduces the myth 
with an expression meaning “just as”: “just as (ὥσπερ καί) the poets tell 
the mythic tale that Chiron...” (Aristotle EE: 1230a3), “just as (καθάπερ) 
also they tell the mythic tale that Iphicles...” (Aristotle HA: 585a13–14), 
“just as (οἷον) also the mythic tale is told of Heracles...” (Aristotle HA: 
585b21–23), “just as (ὥσπερ) [...] the man whose mythic tales are told 
in Crete” (Aristotle EE: 1229a23–24), “just as (καθάπερ) the ones whose 
mythic tales are told in Sardinia...” (Aristotle Ph.: 218b23–24). This kind 
of link between the conclusions of philosophy and the tales of myth sug-
gests that Aristotle is using some vivid, widely known stories in order 
to make his point clearer.8
(5c) In some cases Aristotle mentions that someone mythologei nei-
ther to confute him nor to show that his tales agree with his philosophi-
cal thesis, but rather just as a parenthetical aside. This is the case of the 
mythos about the generation of orioles, which is a little tangent within 
an account of interspecies animal conflicts (Aristotle HA: 609b1–11). 
This is also the case of the tale regarding the origin of the starry herons, 
a tale that is at best related to what Aristotle says about the behavior of 
this species but is not used as a proof of that behavior. Also the tale of 
Heracles in Chaonia seems just a erudite remark, as Aristotle does not 
explicitly refute it, but on the other hand he does not introduce it as 
agreeing with his own theory.
Summing up, it is possible to state that for Aristotle, mythologein 
happens when (1) a single person or many people who, at least in some 
cases, all live in the same region, tell something that is either (2–3a) 
impossible and, as a consequence, false, or (2–3b) internally consistent, 
even though Aristotle does not present it as true. (5a) Aristotle mentions 
8 Of course, it is possible to imagine other reasons for Aristotle to show the agreement 
between his philosophy and myth. For example, one can think that he wanted to show that his 
philosophy was not ungodly, that his rational conclusions were consistent with traditional religion.
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tales of the former kind to confute them, but (5b) he shows that the latter 
kinds of myth agree with his own thesis. It looks like the fact that a tale 
is the object of mythologhein has no automatic implication about truth 
value for Aristotle, as only the examination of the tale by a philosopher, 
who has a grounded knowledge of nature and causes, can tell if the tale 
is false because impossible or is internally consistent, even if not true. 
By the way, this means that, even though one myth is cited by Aristotle 
as a support, however weak, for his own theory, logically it must be the 
other way round, i.e. it is the agreement with his philosophical theory 
that proves the story possible. It is also interesting to note that none of 
the traditional religious myths mentioned by Aristotle is impossible in 
his eyes, as indeed they are mostly shown to be internally consistent. (4) 
One of the reasons why people mythologousin is that they try to make 
sense of the world around them; however, there must be other motives 
for people to tell such tales.
3. The meaning of the passage about Ares and Aphrodite
What does all this tell us about the myth of Ares and Aphrodite?
(1) First of all, this tale is special because it is the only case in which 
Aristotle talks about the man who emythologêse first.9 This is an important 
specification, as it tells us that the activity of mythologein had a beginning. 
There have been other people who have told stories about supernatural 
figures (we have seen that the tale of Chiron is narrated by “the poets”), 
and, above all, one can presume that there have been other people who 
were the first to tell such stories. If the story of Heracles’ gifts to Cha-
onians is repeated only in Chaonia, it is likely that its source is different 
from the story of e.g. Ares and Aphrodite. The latter story is known by 
all Greeks, so, if the former was originally told by the same person, it, 
too, would have been in wide circulation. But this is not the case, so the 
origin of the two stories is different. Only some of the myths of tradi-
tional religion were originally told by the man who emythologêse first.10
(2) As for the truth of the tale, the passage about Ares and Aphro-
9 One may interpret the phrase ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος as the first man who told the story 
about Ares and Aphrodite being lovers. I do not think this is the correct interpretation, though, as 
the specification about who told a specific tale first (or invented it) is not mentioned in the other 
occurrences of mythologein. If Aristotle meant the first man to talk about Ares and Aphrodite 
specifically, he would have referred to the first man to describe Chiron’s pain, the first man to 
tell the story of Heracles and his twin, and so on.
10 This man may be Homer, as he was – as Plato put it – “the poet who educated Greece” 
(Plato R.: 606e2–3), and told the story of Ares and Aphrodite (Homer Od.: VIII.266–367).
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dite is particularly interesting, because here Aristotle states that it was 
the first mythologer who coupled Ares and Aphrodite (on this myth, 
see Cyrino 2010: 17–18; also 49–52, on Aphrodite and warfare; Pironti 
2015a). The other passages in which Aristotle mentions tales about 
figures of traditional religion are neutral about the truth value of the 
tales; that is to say, those passages are compatible with the hypothesis 
that Aristotle believed those tales to be true. However, this is not the 
case with the passage about Ares and Aphrodite, as here Aristotle states 
that the relationship between those two deities was invented by a man.11 
Theoretically this does not necessarily imply that Ares and Aphrodite 
themselves are human inventions, but there is strong possibility that 
this is the case. Also, insofar other religious myths are similar to the 
one about the affair between Ares and Aphrodite, what Aristotle says 
about the latter means that the former, too, are false. It is now possible 
to specify the nature of the tales related by people who mythologousin: 
with the possible exception of the report of the very salty Palestinian lake, 
all these tales are false, even though some of them are straightforwardly 
impossible, while others are internally consistent.
Three questions remain. Even though a mythic tale is false, one may 
wonder (3) whether it is related to something true. The answer to this 
question allows us in turn to understand (4) why this tale was invented 
and (5) why Aristotle mentions it. The most important statement from 
this point of view is that the first mythologer acted “not irrationally”. This 
comment implies that mythologein is something that can be done alogôs or 
not alogôs. It is tempting to match this distinction with the one that I have 
proposed on the basis of the analysis of the passages about mythologein. 
The tales told by people who mythologousin irrationally are impossible and 
false, so the philosopher cites them only in order to confute them. Those 
who mythologousi not irrationally tell stories that are internally consistent, 
and for this reason are not presented by Aristotle as false, but rather are 
mentioned as agreeing with his philosophical conclusion. Of course, the 
11 Maybe it is not by chance if the made-up nature of the myth is explicit in the one passage 
about the first mythologos. In fact, it seems that in the other passages Aristotle talks about the 
people who mythologousin in the sense of repeating tales they have heard, whereas here he refers 
to the man who emythologêse in the sense of inventing the myth (the difference being marked 
by the specification that this was the f irst man to mythologein). Now, nothing changes in the act 
of repeating a tale one learned some time ago if the tale is true or false, so it makes sense for 
Aristotle, when he talks about people who echo mythic tales, to not take a stand about the truth 
values of the tales themselves. If, on the other hand, referring to the first mythologer implies 
that the tales this man told were fabricated by him, it may have been natural for Aristotle to use 
a phrase like “to couple Ares and Aphrodite” in this context.
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fact that for Aristotle it is possible to tell myths not irrationally also has 
interesting implications about the relationship between mythos and logos 
according to Aristotle. The fact that a given story is a mythos does not 
automatically mean that is not consistent with logos; neither, of course, 
does it mean that it does conform with the results of a rational analysis. 
Rather, being a mythos and being logikos are two independent features 
of each tale. Moreover, stating that the coupling of Ares and Aphrodite 
was not contrary to reason confirms that Aristotle, rather than looking 
for validation of his philosophical theories in myths, appraises the mythos 
in light of the logos. Here it is explicit that the mythic tale is evaluated 
by philosophical reason.
It is interesting to wonder why the myth of Ares and Aphrodite 
is not alogos. Aristotle states that coupling these two deities was not 
irrational because men who love to fight also like to have sex. Now, this 
causal relationship can be interpreted in two different ways, which have 
different implications.
First, Aristotle may mean that Ares is just an example of a warrior 
having an affair.12 If this is what he means, this passage would be similar 
to the other references to traditional religious tales we have noted when 
examining the meaning of mythologein in Aristotle. The relationship 
between the tale “Ares has an affair with Aphrodite” and the theory “all 
warriors like sex” would be the same as the one between the tale “Chiron 
would welcome death because his pain was unbearable” and the theory 
“not everyone who is not afraid of death is brave”, or between the tale 
“Heracles and Iphicles had two different fathers despite being born at the 
same time” and the theory “if a woman is impregnated by two different 
men one within a short time, she will give birth to the two children at 
the same time”, and so on. Under this interpretation, the affair between 
Ares and Aphrodite would be an example of the theory, not an allegory 
for it. Ares having an intimate relationship with Aphrodite would be 
an internally consistent tale, something that could be true even though 
it is false, just as in the case of all the other tales that are characteristic 
of traditional religion. The reason why Aristotle does not introduce the 
myth of Ares and Aphrodite with an expression meaning “just as”, as 
he does in the case of other religious myths, would be that in this case 
the philosophical theory is mentioned after the myth and not before 
it. Usually, Aristotle says e.g. “some persons tend to have children all 
of the same gender, just as Heracles has seventy-one sons and only one 
12 This seems to be Mayhew’s interpretation of the passage (Mayhew 2019: 187).
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daughter”. Here, he says instead “the warrior god Ares had an affair 
with Aphrodite, for all warriors like sex”. All in all, there is no differ-
ence between the myth that is introduced as being the work of the first 
mythologos and other tales about similar topics. This means that, just 
as in the case of those tales, perhaps Aristotle mentioned the story of 
Ares and Aphrodite in order to provide his audience with an evocative 
example of a general law of nature. Also, here, too, Aristotle seems not 
to make assumptions about the reason why the myth was told.
However, it is also possible to interpret the causal link between the 
principle “who likes to fight also likes to have sexual intercourses” and 
the story of Ares and Aphrodite in a different way. Aphrodite is not just 
someone whom the warrior Ares has an affair with, but the goddess of 
sex herself; of course, Ares is for his part the god of war. This suggests 
that the affair between Ares and Aphrodite is, rather than an example of 
the sexual appetites of a warrior, an allegory (using this term broadly) of 
the close relationship between a warrior spirit and sexual appetites. Ares 
stands for enthusiasm for fighting and Aphrodite stands for physical 
attraction, so their relationship stands for the close connection between 
war and sex. If it is so, the causal relationship between the principle that 
who likes war also likes sex and the story of Ares and Aphrodite is like 
this: war and sex are related, so the mythologer told that the god of war 
and the goddess of sex had an affair. Under this interpretation, this pas-
sage would be quite different from the other references to mythologein 
where traditional characters are mentioned. Not only would this be an 
allegory while those would be examples, but several other differences 
would be significant. Here we have a reference to two proper deities, 
while there Aristotle talks about heroes (Heracles, the heroes buried in 
Sardinia), centaurs (Chiron) and possibly men (Theseus). Here Aristotle 
refers to the first person who emythologêse, whereas there he talked about 
tales told by poets or common people. Here Aristotle explicitly stresses 
that the tale is not irrational, there he does not. Here the link between 
the mythic tale and the philosophical theory is “myth, because theory”, 
there the link is “theory, just like myth”. Linking all these differences 
together, one can formulate the following hypothesis. The first man to 
mythologein talked about the gods and goddesses; he used them as al-
legories of some key features of reality; this way of talking about reality 
is not as strict as philosophy, but neither is it irrational; for this reason, 
Aristotle can introduce these tales as the first expression of a truth that 
philosophy can now express more correctly. In time other tales were added 
to the religious traditions; they are not about deities, but rather about 
Prolegomena 20 (1) 202120
heroes, centaurs and the like, and even men; Aristotle does not say why 
these tales were invented, but he notes that the facts they depict are not 
impossible, as they are consistent with natural laws; as a consequence, 
he can cite these tales as examples of those laws, possibly to provide a 
powerful image that would help his audience more easily to visualize 
and remember the law.13
While I do not think that it is possible to know for sure which is the 
correct interpretation, I prefer the latter, that is, that Aristotle’s reference 
to Ares and Aphrodite is an allegory of sort. In fact, all Aristotelian 
references to Aphrodite suggest something about sexual desire. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, he says that the poets’ words about the goddess show 
what appetite is: something that deceitfully deprives wise men of their 
wisdom (Aristotle EN: 1149b14–18). This note seems mirrored in the 
Rhetoric, where, while discussing the theory that names bear important 
meanings, Aristotle reminds the reader that Euripides said that it is not 
by chance that the name Ἀφροδίτη and the noun ἀφροσύνη (folly) stem 
from the same root (Aristotle Rh.: 1400b23–24). A different etymology 
is provided in the Generation of Animals, where Aristotle states that 
the name of the goddess derives from foam, because Aphrodite over-
sees sexual intercourses, i.e. the production of semen, which is a kind 
of foam (ἀφρώδης, Aristotle GA: 736a18–21; on the etymology of the 
name Aphrodite, see Cyrino 2010: 25–27; Pironti 2015b). Even more 
fittingly, in the possibly Aristotelian Problems it is said that the reason 
why Aphrodite’s union with Dionysus is correct is that the divine couple 
corresponds to two pairs that are often observed in human existence: 
sexual pleasure and wine, lust and melancholy (Aristotle Pr.: 953b30–
33).14 In all these cases, Aphrodite is, in a broad sense, an allegory for sex.
13 Even if this hypothesis is true, it would not affect the validity of the assertion that all 
the tales of the religious tradition are false for Aristotle. Given that the tales told by the first 
mythologer are inventions, it makes sense to think that the stories that have been told later are 
fictitious, too.
14 Aphrodite is also mentioned in On the Soul, where Aristotle says that Democritus speaks 
like Philippus, a comic playwright who said that, in order to make the wooden Aphrodite he 
had built move, Daedalus put quicksilver in it (Aristotle de An.: 406b15–20). In On Divination 
in Sleep, Aristotle mentions that those who say “Ἀφροδίτην φροδίτην” as an example of the mental 
habits of melancholic people, whose thoughts and speeches are ruled by mere verbal association 
(Aristotle Div. Somn.: 464a32–464b4). In the Rhetoric, it is quoted the passage of the Iliad where 
Achilles states that he would not marry one of Agamemnon’s daughters even if she was more 
beautiful than Aphrodite (Aristotle Rh.: 1413a33–34, Homer Il.: IX.387–388). It is also possible 
that Aphrodite is the implicit subject of λοχεύσατο κύκλοπα κούρην, “brought forth a round eye” 
(or “a round-eyed girl”, depending on how one interprets κούρην), in a fragment of Empedocles 
quoted in the Sense and Sensibilia (Aristotle Sens.: 438a1); that the subject of this sentence is 
Aphrodite is the opinion of e.g. Beare (1906: 17), Johansen (1997: 51) and Kalderon (2015: 7, 11).
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4. Concluding remarks
It is now possible for me to offer an answer to the questions about myths 
on which scholars disagree. Of course, the following answers only apply 
to the passage about Ares and Aphrodite.
Should the original worldviews conveyed by myths be attributed to the 
poets or to the pre­cataclysmic philosophers? Of course, the first mythologer 
Aristotle refers to is not a philosopher, as he is someone who fabricates 
a non-irrational tale, as opposed to someone who provides a rational 
argument. If he is a poet, he seems to have had a special status among 
his peers, as his tale is – if my reading of the passage about Ares and 
Aphrodite is correct – some sort of allegory, not an example like the tale 
of Chiron told by “the poets”. Whether the link between inclination to 
war and sexual drive was a finding of the first mythologer or the trace 
of a pre-cataclysmic philosophy is not indicated in the passage; however, 
nothing in Aristotle’s wording suggests the need to assume a pre-mythic 
philosophy.
Does Aristotle associate mythos and falseness in the case of the worldviews 
conveyed by all, some or none of the traditional myths? The worldview about 
war and sex conveyed by the tale of Ares and Aphrodite is for Aristotle 
true, so this rules out the latter option: it is not true that no traditional 
myth conveys a false worldview. It is also notable that the other religious 
tales that are mythologemena are consistent with natural laws.
In the case of truthful myths, is the lack of exactness of the mythical 
language enough to make the core truth useless for the progress of philosophy 
or not? Even though it may be meaningful that Aristotle mentions the 
tale of Ares and Aphrodite before the rational expression of the same 
core truth, it does not seem that the philosophical discovery of this truth 
depends on the myth, as the observation of the different behaviours of 
different races should be enough to reach the general conclusion that 
the people who are inclined to war also have more sex.15
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